Close unauthenticated remote mutation paths and keep filesystem destinations behind one-shot Tauri capabilities. CodeRabbit and Greptile findings were fixed on-branch; all review threads are resolved. Full CI, Security, Rust, and cross-platform smoke checks are green.
Renames what users see. The app, the installers, the window title, the
docs and all 21 locales now say VoiceStudio, with "(previously
OmniVoice-Studio)" noted near the title of each doc surface so people
recognise it.
Deliberately NOT renamed, because renaming any of them silently breaks
an existing install — there is no legacy-path fallback anywhere in this
codebase:
- bundle identifier com.debpalash.omnivoice-studio (MSI UpgradeCode,
macOS TCC grants, managed venv, WebView localStorage, the
single-instance lock)
- data directories OmniVoice / .omnivoice and omnivoice.db
- the ~150 OMNIVOICE_* environment variables
- the X-OmniVoice-* HTTP headers (a wire protocol)
- the published Docker image paths
- the OmniVoice ENGINE, which is a model name and not this product
tests/test_identity_paths_survive_the_rename.py pins every one of those
so a future well-meaning sweep cannot orphan a user's library.
Linux .deb users install a new package name and should apt remove
omnivoice-studio; that note is in the changelog.
A meticulous report from an LXC/CPU-only source install surfaced three real defects: the build script deleted the libggml shared libraries a dynamically-linked build needs (first spawn died with exit 127), the hardcoded 120s per-spawn kill switch reaped legitimate CPU-only renders, and OMNIVOICE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS — the only fix for cross-origin browser access — was documented nowhere.
All platform branches of scripts/build-omnivoice-tts.sh now copy the shared libs next to the binary, the CI artifact glob uploads them, and the backend puts bin/ on the loader path for every spawn of the engine binary. The timeout defaults to 600s (above the pool guard's well-diagnosed 300s deadline), is tunable via OMNIVOICE_GGUF_GENERATE_TIMEOUT_S with non-finite values rejected, and the timeout error names the knob. CORS documented in api-auth.md with a pointer from remote-gpu.md. Regression tests pin the spawn-env rule, the per-branch copy rule, the artifact glob, and the timeout behavior.
CodeRabbit: the 6-digit share PIN is brute-forceable (10^6, no lockout), so
letting it unlock admin over the network was still weak. Admin now requires the
API key (a long operator secret) or loopback; the PIN is consumption-only and
never gates /system/* or /api/settings/*. A PIN-only deployment keeps admin
loopback-only. Docs (api-auth.md, remote-gpu.md) aligned with the conditional
gate (no credential -> admin open; API key -> admin) and the PIN exclusion.
Test inverted: presenting the PIN over the network is now 403 on admin.
OMNIVOICE_SERVER_MODE=1 made require_loopback an unconditional no-op, so with
OMNIVOICE_TRUSTED_NETWORKS also set a trusted-CIDR client — a consumption-only
exemption that bypasses the PIN/API-key middleware via is_local_host — could
reach the RCE-class admin surface (/system/set-env, /api/settings/*) with no
credential. That collapsed the documented two-tier privilege model
(consumption trust != admin trust) in exactly the "lock the backend with a key,
exempt a LAN proxy for TTS" configuration.
Server mode still can't require true loopback (Docker NAT, #261), but it now
applies the credential rule to admin routes: open only when NO credential is
configured; otherwise the request must present the API key or share PIN.
Trusted-network membership alone never satisfies it. Loopback, credential
holders, and no-credential Docker deployments are unchanged; consumption
routes (require_local / middleware) keep exempting trusted networks.
Regression tests cover the server-mode x trusted-network x credential matrix
(fail-before/pass-after). Docs: new docs/api-auth.md two-tier model + quick
reference; docs/remote-gpu.md corrected (previously documented the hole as
accepted behavior).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Gius