d91beef0fd314250d8d9b94de86dfea019a8bd96
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Palash Debnath
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5cab8e0149 |
feat: rename the product to VoiceStudio (previously OmniVoice-Studio)
Renames what users see. The app, the installers, the window title, the
docs and all 21 locales now say VoiceStudio, with "(previously
OmniVoice-Studio)" noted near the title of each doc surface so people
recognise it.
Deliberately NOT renamed, because renaming any of them silently breaks
an existing install — there is no legacy-path fallback anywhere in this
codebase:
- bundle identifier com.debpalash.omnivoice-studio (MSI UpgradeCode,
macOS TCC grants, managed venv, WebView localStorage, the
single-instance lock)
- data directories OmniVoice / .omnivoice and omnivoice.db
- the ~150 OMNIVOICE_* environment variables
- the X-OmniVoice-* HTTP headers (a wire protocol)
- the published Docker image paths
- the OmniVoice ENGINE, which is a model name and not this product
tests/test_identity_paths_survive_the_rename.py pins every one of those
so a future well-meaning sweep cannot orphan a user's library.
Linux .deb users install a new package name and should apt remove
omnivoice-studio; that note is in the changelog.
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debpalashandClaude Fable 5
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933743e336 |
fix: resolve open issue batch — #1172 #1173 #1174 #1185 #1186 #1188
- validate managed binaries before exec; 0-byte GGUF placeholders fail actionably instead of "Exec format error" (#1172) - KittenTTS: tokenizer-measured chunking to the ONNX 512-token cap; clear 400 for unspeakable input (#1173) - clean SIGTERM during weight load: shutdown-aware loader, benign cancelled-load classification, lifespan hardening, scoped log silencers (transformers load + alembic fileConfig) (#1174) - broken ASR deep-imports (lightning_fabric) mark the engine unavailable with a repair hint and fall through (#1185) - uv cache + managed Python follow the chosen install drive on Windows (cherry-picked cross-drive class fix + spaces/D: tests) (#1186) - adaptive silence-removal ladder for quiet clone references; localized actionable error for truly silent clips, all 21 locales (#1188) - CHANGELOG: consolidated Unreleased into the quiet one-liner style Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d57ecea804 |
fix(test): DB migration-safety tests leak-proof against full-suite order (#909 follow-up) (#917)
The PR #909 data-safe-update tests passed in isolation but failed only in full-suite CI order. Two independent, order-dependent leaks were at play: 1. Module-identity leak (the #878/#894 class). The `isolated_db`/`fresh_app`/ `fresh_resolver` fixtures in tests/backend/** purge `core.*`/`services.*` from `sys.modules` and never restore them, so `sys.modules["core.db"]` afterward is a DIFFERENT object than the one the migration-safety tests imported at collection. `monkeypatch.setattr("core.db.DB_PATH", ...)` re-resolved the dotted string to the re-imported module, while `_run_alembic_upgrade`/`init_db` (bound at collection) kept reading the ORIGINAL module's globals — so the patch missed and the upgrade ran against the ambient session DB. Result: no backup at the asserted path, and the mid-flight-failure injection never hit the expected DB (DID NOT RAISE). The same divergence hit the lazy `from core import db_backup` inside `_run_alembic_upgrade`, so patching `MAX_BACKUP_DB_BYTES` was silently lost. 2. Logger-disable leak. Alembic's env.py called `fileConfig(...)` with the default `disable_existing_loggers=True`, which disabled the already-created `omnivoice.db.backup` logger the first time any earlier test ran a real `alembic upgrade` — so the oversized-DB "Skipping pre-migration DB backup" line was never emitted and the caplog assertion failed. This also silently mutes the live app's logging after a real startup migration. Fixes: - env.py: `fileConfig(..., disable_existing_loggers=False)` so a migration never mutes the app's (or another test's) loggers. - core/db.py: import `db_backup`/`APP_VERSION` at module level so `_run_alembic_upgrade` uses a stable reference immune to a `sys.modules` purge, matching what tests patch at collection. - test_db_migration_safety.py: patch DB_PATH on the imported `core.db` module object rather than the re-resolvable dotted string — the correct, self-contained seam. Verified: the four migration-safety tests + the oversized-backup test pass in full-suite order and in isolation; full `pytest tests/` is green (2206 passed, 0 failed). Co-authored-by: mergetest <test@local> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Palash Debnath
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4a6b978df9 |
Phase 1 Wave 1: HF token persistence + redactor (closes #35) (#91)
* feat(01-01): encrypted settings store + alembic migration (AUTH-02, T-01-01) Adds the SQLite-backed encrypted settings store that Phase 1 token resolver will read from. Closes the at-rest plaintext risk for HF tokens (T-01-01). - backend/services/settings_store.py: get_hf_token / set_hf_token / clear_hf_token using Fernet symmetric AEAD. Stored value column never contains the literal "hf_" substring. - backend/services/_secret_key.py: per-install Fernet key derived via scrypt(machine-id + 16-byte random salt). machine-id resolution covers macOS (ioreg IOPlatformUUID), Linux (/etc/machine-id and dbus fallback), Windows (HKLM Cryptography MachineGuid via winreg). Final fallback to hostname+user with a warn log. - backend/migrations/versions/0001_phase1_settings_table.py: alembic migration adding `settings(key, value, updated_at)`. Idempotent — checks for an existing table so fresh installs (where _BASE_SCHEMA already created it) and v0.2.7 upgrades both succeed. - backend/core/db.py: _BASE_SCHEMA grows the settings table for fresh installs; init_db() now runs `alembic upgrade head` after the CREATE. - backend/migrations/env.py: honours an externally-set sqlalchemy.url so tests can point alembic at a fixture DB; falls back to core.config DB_PATH for production. - pyproject.toml: cryptography>=41 added explicitly (RESEARCH.md Assumption A1 was checked at execute-time and proved false; the dep was not present transitively, so the install would fail without this). Tests (10 cases, all green): - Round-trip encryption + plaintext-leakage check (T-01-01 invariant) - Salt persistence across clear/set cycles - InvalidToken decrypt path returns None (Open Question #5 resolution) - Concurrent reads consistent under sqlite WAL - Alembic upgrade on a hand-built v0.2.7 fixture DB preserves all existing tables + seeded rows (CLAUDE.md backward-compat constraint) - Alembic downgrade -1 drops only the settings table Refs #35. * feat(01-01): 3-source HF token resolver + log redactor + 5 read sites patched Closes the #35 bug class (bare os.environ.get('HF_TOKEN') reads) by routing every backend HF-token consumer through one resolver, and mitigates T-01-02 (info disclosure via logs) by stripping `hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}` substrings from every log record at the root logger. backend/services/token_resolver.py: - resolve(skip) — 3-source cascade (App → Env → HF-CLI), each source validated via huggingface_hub.whoami(); first valid wins. - on_401(active) — invalidate cache and re-resolve skipping the source that just 401'd (AUTH-06). - state() — three SourceState rows for the Settings UI: set, masked preview (hf_…<last 3>), whoami_user, whoami_ok. - save_app_token / clear_app_token — wraps settings_store + calls huggingface_hub.login(add_to_git_credential=False) per Pitfall #2. - 300-second whoami cache so repeated Settings-page renders don't hit the HF API. backend/core/logging_filter.py: - HFTokenRedactor(logging.Filter) — regex `hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}` so real tokens are masked but `hf_hub` / `hf_token` literals survive. - install_redaction_filter() — idempotent attach to root + every handler. backend/main.py: install the redactor at startup, BEFORE the file handler is added. Re-installed after the file handler attaches so the handler-attached filter list includes it too. Read-side call sites patched (per Pitfall #1 — every HF token read must flow through token_resolver.resolve()): - backend/api/routers/dub_core.py:540 (the original #35 site) - backend/api/routers/system.py:38 (_has_hf_token notification) - backend/services/model_manager.py:480 (diarization pipeline auth) - backend/services/sonitranslate.py:143 (Popen env for SoniTranslate child) - backend/services/sonitranslate.py:217 (gradio_client predict call) New endpoint: - GET /system/hf-token/state — returns the 3-source cascade state with masked tokens for the Wave 2 Settings UI panel. Grep gate confirmed clean: zero `os.environ.get("HF_TOKEN")` reads remain outside token_resolver.py. Tests (17 new cases, all green): - tests/backend/services/test_token_resolver.py: priority cascade, 401 skip mid-resolve, on_401 fallback, state() shape, save+login invariant (add_to_git_credential=False), HUGGING_FACE_HUB_TOKEN alias acceptance. - tests/backend/core/test_logging_filter.py: msg + args redaction, multi-token redaction, non-string args pass-through, short-token literals preserved, install_redaction_filter idempotence. Refs #35. * feat(01-01): Settings hf-token API endpoints + subprocess env injection (AUTH-03/04) Backend half of the Wave 2 Settings → API Keys UI plus the AUTH-04 subprocess env-injection invariant. backend/api/routers/settings.py: - POST /api/settings/hf-token — body {token: str} → save_app_token - DELETE /api/settings/hf-token — also_clear_hf_cli query → clear_app_token - GET /api/settings/hf-token/state — same shape as token_resolver.state() All three are gated by `Depends(require_loopback)` at the router level (threat T-01-03 mitigation; non-loopback Host → 403). backend/main.py: router mounted alongside existing API routers. Subprocess env injection (AUTH-04, threat T-01-04 disposition=accept): - backend/services/sonitranslate.py already updated in Task 2 to read via token_resolver.resolve() and inject HF_TOKEN + YOUR_HF_TOKEN into the SoniTranslate child env block. - backend/services/gpu_sandbox.py: NOT patched — the GPU sandbox runs in-process TTS generation that uses the parent's already-loaded HF state. Adding env injection there is a no-op (parent and child share state via multiprocessing.Pipe before any HF API call). - backend/services/model_manager.py:480 (Task 2): resolves in-process, no subprocess crosses here. - backend/api/routers/exports.py: subprocess.Popen calls only spawn `open` / `explorer` / `xdg-open` — file-manager launchers with no HF needs. Skipped per Task 3 conservative-patching rule. So the canonical AUTH-04 site for this milestone is sonitranslate.py. Future SubprocessBackend work in Phase 2 will inherit the same pattern. Tests (8 new cases, all green): - tests/backend/test_engine_spawn_token.py * POST /hf-token loopback → 200 + state.active == "app" * POST /hf-token non-loopback → 403 ("loopback origin required") * DELETE /hf-token clears settings_store + state.active == None * GET /hf-token/state returns 3 source rows in priority order * GET /hf-token/state non-loopback → 403 * env block contains HF_TOKEN + YOUR_HF_TOKEN when resolver returns one * env block does NOT contain an injected empty HF_TOKEN when resolver returns None * source-level check that backend/services/sonitranslate.py still reads via token_resolver.resolve() (regression guard against silent reverts of the AUTH-04 wiring) Full Wave 1 test suite: 35/35 green. Phase 0 smoke tests still green. Refs #35. * docs(01-01): SUMMARY + STATE update for Phase 1 Wave 1 completion Records execution outcome of the 3-task plan: 10 files created, 9 modified, 35 new test cases, 5 read sites patched, grep gate clean. Documents the two Rule-3/Rule-2 deviations applied (cryptography dep, env.py URL override), the subprocess-launcher inventory for Phase 2, and the known stray edit to the main repo's pyproject.toml that needs a one- line user action to revert. Updates STATE.md current-position table, progress bar, and open TODOs to point at Wave 2 (Plan 01-02) and Wave 3 (Plan 01-03) as the next steps. |
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debpalash
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6f124fb175 | feat: implement frontend UI components and expand research documentation for voice processing and translation workflows. |