Remote workers connect outbound: the node dials the control plane, spends an
enrollment token, pins a certificate. That stays the default and is unchanged.
It is also structurally 1:1 — a worker process holds one endpoint, one pinned
certificate and one worker id — so a second person wanting the same GPU box has
to get shell access to it, repoint the start script at their own address and
restart, which disconnects whoever was using it. Sharing a GPU requires root on
it and evicts the incumbent, and no amount of UI work fixes that, because the
constraint is the shape of the connection.
This adds the other arrangement: the node listens, and any panel holding a key
connects to it, concurrently, with no shell access to the machine.
* NodeService mirrors WorkerService. Transport roles invert; message roles do
not — the node still sends WorkerMessage and the panel still sends
ServerMessage, so every state machine on both sides is untouched. Register
folds into the stream as the first exchange and reuses the existing
request/response messages rather than growing parallel ones.
* Keys are per panel, not per node. Revoking one person leaves everyone else
connected; a shared key would be revoked by nobody and leave no record of
who used it. Stored hashed, compared in constant time against every key so
the reply time is not an oracle, and the plaintext exists exactly once.
* Failed authentication is throttled per source address, so one stale
bookmark cannot lock out a different panel.
* A connection log records every attach, refusal and disconnect, and any
session can be kicked. That is what replaces per-job approval, which would
make a shared GPU unusable and train people to click yes.
* Artifacts invert too: the panel pushes inputs before assigning, and fetches
results after. The node stages both under one contained directory and
trusts no id or filename off the wire.
Runs in plaintext by deliberate decision, recorded with its accepted risk in
docs/adr/inbound-node-mode.md, and scoped there to LAN and self-hosted use —
never a fleet transport, which goal_v2 B2/B5.2 still require to dial out.
Off by default, and bound to 127.0.0.1 until someone explicitly widens it.
Renames what users see. The app, the installers, the window title, the
docs and all 21 locales now say VoiceStudio, with "(previously
OmniVoice-Studio)" noted near the title of each doc surface so people
recognise it.
Deliberately NOT renamed, because renaming any of them silently breaks
an existing install — there is no legacy-path fallback anywhere in this
codebase:
- bundle identifier com.debpalash.omnivoice-studio (MSI UpgradeCode,
macOS TCC grants, managed venv, WebView localStorage, the
single-instance lock)
- data directories OmniVoice / .omnivoice and omnivoice.db
- the ~150 OMNIVOICE_* environment variables
- the X-OmniVoice-* HTTP headers (a wire protocol)
- the published Docker image paths
- the OmniVoice ENGINE, which is a model name and not this product
tests/test_identity_paths_survive_the_rename.py pins every one of those
so a future well-meaning sweep cannot orphan a user's library.
Linux .deb users install a new package name and should apt remove
omnivoice-studio; that note is in the changelog.
Removes ~110 files of process noise (all preserved in git history):
.planning/ (GSD-era phases/quick-plans/issue-clusters; workflow retired
2026-07-08), specs/ (spec-kit specs for shipped features 001-007),
design/ (pre-React ASCII mockups), research/ (legacy Gradio archive),
and .agents/ (rules for a third-party agent tool no longer in use).
The four load-bearing decision docs move to docs/adr/ with an archival
note; every live pointer follows (gguf engine module docs + quant_map,
inject-apprun.sh, pyproject/test comments, fixture README + its seed
script — kept byte-identical). The CJK allowlist drops the deleted
legacy_gradio entries; STRUCTURE.md and ROADMAP.md document the removal
instead of linking into it.
Backend suite: 2891 passed.
Co-authored-by: mergetest <test@local>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Palash Debnath