d91beef0fd314250d8d9b94de86dfea019a8bd96
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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19ae20111a |
fix(security): replace persistent admin keys with scoped sessions (#1528)
* fix(security): replace persistent admin keys with sessions Exchange the remote administrator key once for bounded, revocable credentials. Canonicalize backend principals, enforce cookie CSRF and exact origins, and use path-bound one-use WebSocket tickets. Migrate the bundled UI away from durable master-key storage and credential-bearing URLs. Add unit, integration, static-hygiene, and production-browser regressions plus synchronized operator documentation. * docs: link session hardening to PR 1528 * fix(security): key session indexes with process pepper Use HMAC-SHA-256 instead of an unkeyed digest for in-memory session and WebSocket-ticket indexes. This preserves constant-size lookup identifiers, makes copied records unusable without the process pepper, and resolves CodeQL's weak sensitive-data hash finding. * fix(auth): align empty bearer migration precedence Centralize the Authorization-channel presence decision with canonical principal parsing. Bearer followed only by spaces now remains an empty channel during legacy cookie migration, while unsupported or invalid explicit credentials stay authoritative and fail closed. * fix(security): harden admin session review boundaries * fix(security): derive key generations with HKDF * fix(auth): anchor the admin-session store so module reloads cannot fork it test_master_exchange_does_not_bypass_pin_on_normal_routes failed in full-suite runs: test_mcp_bindings' client fixture purges the services.* tree from sys.modules and reloads main, so api.routers.auth re-imported a fresh services.admin_sessions (new AdminSessionStore) while core.auth kept its import-time reference to the old one — the exchange issued the cookie into one store and the middleware resolved it against another, turning the expected "PIN required" into "API key required". Root cause is the class of bug, not the one test: a process-global auth store defined as a bare module-level singleton forks under importlib.reload or purge-and-reimport. Fix at the source: admin_session_store now resolves through a synthetic sys.modules anchor (_omnivoice_admin_session_store_anchor) that reloads never re-execute and package-prefix purges never match, so every copy of the module shares the one per-process store. No consumer or behavior changes. Regression test reproduces both fork vectors (in-place reload and sys.modules purge + fresh import) and asserts previously issued sessions still resolve and the store identity is preserved; it fails before this fix and passes after. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): honor X-Forwarded-Proto for CSRF origin and Secure cookies behind TLS proxies Behind Tailscale Serve (docs/remote-gpu.md) or any TLS-terminating proxy, the browser talks https while the backend hop stays http, so exact-origin CSRF compared an https Origin against an http expectation and rejected every legitimate request, and the session cookie shipped without Secure. uvicorn's ProxyHeadersMiddleware only rewrites the scope for loopback peers, which misses Docker and any non-loopback proxy topology. New core.csrf.effective_scheme derives the client-facing scheme: resolved scope first (uvicorn's trusted-proxy rewrite wins), then an upgrade-only read of X-Forwarded-Proto's first value — https/wss promotes http to https, everything else is ignored, and a genuine TLS hop can never be downgraded. Used by both the destination-origin comparison and auth._secure_cookie so the WS-ticket/logout CSRF paths and the cookie Secure flag agree. Spoofing gains nothing: the host:port half of the origin tuple is untouched, browsers cannot attach the header cross-site without a preflight this API never grants, and forging it on plain http only adds Secure (the browser then drops the cookie — self-harm only). Regression tests: proxied https origin accepted (origin check, Secure flag, logout), comma-separated chains, scope-fallback path, spoofed header still rejects cross-origin, cannot downgrade real https, junk values ignored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): consume the stored admin key only after a successful exchange A remote-backend user upgrading with their backend unreachable lost the only stored copy of OMNIVOICE_API_KEY: every migration path deleted the durable ov_api_key BEFORE the session exchange settled, stranding them until they recovered the key from the server box. Close the whole class: - client.ts bootstrap: read the legacy key, exchange first, and remove the durable copy only after the exchange succeeds; on failure the key stays so the next launch retries the migration (auth gate still rises). - authSession.ts exchangeApiKey: move removeLegacyMaster from before the fetch to the cookie/bearer success paths — the key never coexists with a live session, but a rejected or hung exchange no longer consumes it. - remoteBackendProbe.ts configuredRemoteBackend: stop wiping the key on every app mount. - RemoteBackendPanel: a connection test or an aborted save no longer wipes the pending key; only disabling the remote backend discards it. - prefKeys.js: ov_api_key moves from PREF_KEYS to PRESERVED_KEYS — factory reset preserves the pending connection credential exactly like ov_backend_url; the successful migration is what deletes it. Tighten the credential-hygiene static guard to match: it accepted sessionStorage.setItem('ov_api_key', …) — the exact class it exists to close. The guard now flags .setItem(<master key>) on any storage receiver, quote style, or injected-store alias, with a self-test pinning what it catches and what stays legal. Fail-before/pass-after regression tests: backend unreachable retains the key and the next bootstrap retries it; a successful exchange removes it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(auth): make session validation occupancy-independent * test(auth): catch optional master-key storage calls * feat(docs): add PR control document for bultodepapas in VoiceStudio * docs: keep the PR tracking board in the fork; credit the changelog line The pr-control document is excellent process discipline, but it is the contributor's own operational board (their inventory, their update commands) — it lives naturally in their fork, and docs/agents/ here is context every repo agent loads. Removed with appreciation; the changelog line gains its contributor credit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: debpalash <4178343+debpalash@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Palash DebnathandClaude Opus 4.8
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f7cfd33994 |
polish(network): outermost PIN gate + non-buffering ASGI middleware + listener test (#160)
* fix(network-share): mount RemoteAuthGate at outermost provider Move the <RemoteAuthGate> wrap from App.jsx's main-studio return up to main-app.jsx, inside QueryClientProvider and wrapping the entire app tree (both the dictation widget and <App />). Previously the gate only wrapped the studio return, so a remote device opening a bare URL (no ?pin=) during first-run states — the /setup/status check, SetupWizard, or BootstrapSplash early returns — would 401 with no gate rendered to collect the PIN. The QR path was fine (PIN captured pre-fetch in client.ts); only bare-URL was broken. Remove the App.jsx wrap to avoid double-gating (two PIN dialogs). No behavior change for loopback or QR users. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(network-share): make NetworkAccessMiddleware non-buffering ASGI Rewrite NetworkAccessMiddleware from a starlette BaseHTTPMiddleware into a pure ASGI middleware (class with __init__(app) and __call__(scope, receive, send)). BaseHTTPMiddleware buffers StreamingResponse/SSE bodies before forwarding them, so PIN'd LAN clients on streaming endpoints (dictation SSE, tts streaming, /system/logs/stream) got buffered/laggy responses. Loopback was unaffected (bypasses early), but remote-share streaming was degraded. The ASGI form forwards send untouched on every pass-through path, and only wraps send to inject Set-Cookie on the http.response.start message for the first valid-PIN request — the body keeps streaming chunk-by-chunk. request.app resolves in ASGI scope (Starlette sets scope["app"]), so the inert/loopback/ shell/PIN logic is identical to before. Registered after CORS (unchanged) so CORS stays outermost. All 5 existing behavior tests pass unchanged. Adds three tests: a guard that the middleware is not a BaseHTTPMiddleware subclass, a StreamingResponse pass-through (401 without PIN, full chunked stream with PIN, no buffered Content-Length), and a Set-Cookie-via-ASGI assertion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(network-share): integration test for real listener lifecycle Add tests/test_network_share_lifecycle.py exercising the real second uvicorn listener: await network_share.enable(app) on a minimal FastAPI app, assert get_state().enabled is True with a share_port set and a live TCP listener on that port (real socket connect), then await disable(app) and assert the state resets and the port stops accepting connections. Uses the returned share_port (never a hardcoded port) and tolerates teardown timing by polling for socket close. Wrapped in asyncio.run inside a sync test so it does not depend on a pytest-asyncio event-loop mode; skips gracefully if binding 0.0.0.0 is not permitted in the sandbox. Defensive cleanup resets the module-level state on any failure path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Palash DebnathandClaude Opus 4.8
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fa1503c4eb |
feat: network sharing (PIN-gated LAN + QR) & Tailscale remote access (#125) (#159)
* docs(spec): network sharing + Tailscale remote access design Same-state LAN sharing via a second in-process uvicorn listener on a dedicated share port (no restart, model/jobs preserved), PIN-gated for non-loopback clients, with QR + all-LAN-addresses panel. Tailscale serve for private remote access. Supersedes the raw 0.0.0.0 default-flip in #125. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(spec): control endpoints reuse existing require_loopback gate Security review of #157 confirmed the /system router is already loopback-gated via Depends(require_loopback) (non-spoofable request.client.host). The network control endpoints inherit it and /system/set-env is auto-protected from the LAN listener — no new guard needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(network): share-listener module — LAN enumeration + PIN + lifecycle Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(network): loopback-only control endpoints + /system/info sharing fields Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(cjk): scan git-tracked files only, not untracked vendored dirs The no-hardcoded-CJK guard walked the filesystem, so local untracked vendored experiments (research/voice-pro etc. with JP issue templates) caused false local failures while CI (committed files) passed. Scan via git ls-files so local-only and CI behavior match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(network): PIN middleware — gate non-loopback API access when sharing on Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(network): inject X-OmniVoice-Pin globally + capture ?pin= from QR URL Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(network): remote PIN gate on 401 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(network): add qrcode dep for share QR Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(network): footer Local/Network toggle with LAN addresses, QR, copy/open Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(tailscale): CLI status + serve enable/disable + endpoints Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(network): Settings → Sharing & Remote Access panel (LAN + Tailscale) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(network): sharing & remote access guide (LAN PIN/QR + Tailscale) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(network): enable() tears down and raises if the share listener never binds Defensive guard (spec §7): if the second uvicorn server doesn't reach 'started' (e.g. the share port was taken in the race after the free-port probe), cancel the task, reset state, and raise — so the API surfaces the failure and the UI stays Local rather than reporting a dead 'Network' state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(network): use globalThis (not Node global) in client.test.ts for tsc CI runs 'tsc --noEmit --checkJs false', which type-checks .ts files; Node's 'global' isn't typed there (TS2304). vitest (esbuild) tolerated it locally. Use globalThis (standard, typed) + cast the mock. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(network): apiFetch leaves opts untouched when no PIN set The unconditional headers merge changed the request shape for callers with no headers (e.g. FormData posts), breaking the legacy 'apiPost passes FormData without Content-Type override' node test. Only spread opts + inject X-OmniVoice-Pin when a PIN is actually present; otherwise pass opts through unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |