* fix(security): replace persistent admin keys with sessions Exchange the remote administrator key once for bounded, revocable credentials. Canonicalize backend principals, enforce cookie CSRF and exact origins, and use path-bound one-use WebSocket tickets. Migrate the bundled UI away from durable master-key storage and credential-bearing URLs. Add unit, integration, static-hygiene, and production-browser regressions plus synchronized operator documentation. * docs: link session hardening to PR 1528 * fix(security): key session indexes with process pepper Use HMAC-SHA-256 instead of an unkeyed digest for in-memory session and WebSocket-ticket indexes. This preserves constant-size lookup identifiers, makes copied records unusable without the process pepper, and resolves CodeQL's weak sensitive-data hash finding. * fix(auth): align empty bearer migration precedence Centralize the Authorization-channel presence decision with canonical principal parsing. Bearer followed only by spaces now remains an empty channel during legacy cookie migration, while unsupported or invalid explicit credentials stay authoritative and fail closed. * fix(security): harden admin session review boundaries * fix(security): derive key generations with HKDF * fix(auth): anchor the admin-session store so module reloads cannot fork it test_master_exchange_does_not_bypass_pin_on_normal_routes failed in full-suite runs: test_mcp_bindings' client fixture purges the services.* tree from sys.modules and reloads main, so api.routers.auth re-imported a fresh services.admin_sessions (new AdminSessionStore) while core.auth kept its import-time reference to the old one — the exchange issued the cookie into one store and the middleware resolved it against another, turning the expected "PIN required" into "API key required". Root cause is the class of bug, not the one test: a process-global auth store defined as a bare module-level singleton forks under importlib.reload or purge-and-reimport. Fix at the source: admin_session_store now resolves through a synthetic sys.modules anchor (_omnivoice_admin_session_store_anchor) that reloads never re-execute and package-prefix purges never match, so every copy of the module shares the one per-process store. No consumer or behavior changes. Regression test reproduces both fork vectors (in-place reload and sys.modules purge + fresh import) and asserts previously issued sessions still resolve and the store identity is preserved; it fails before this fix and passes after. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): honor X-Forwarded-Proto for CSRF origin and Secure cookies behind TLS proxies Behind Tailscale Serve (docs/remote-gpu.md) or any TLS-terminating proxy, the browser talks https while the backend hop stays http, so exact-origin CSRF compared an https Origin against an http expectation and rejected every legitimate request, and the session cookie shipped without Secure. uvicorn's ProxyHeadersMiddleware only rewrites the scope for loopback peers, which misses Docker and any non-loopback proxy topology. New core.csrf.effective_scheme derives the client-facing scheme: resolved scope first (uvicorn's trusted-proxy rewrite wins), then an upgrade-only read of X-Forwarded-Proto's first value — https/wss promotes http to https, everything else is ignored, and a genuine TLS hop can never be downgraded. Used by both the destination-origin comparison and auth._secure_cookie so the WS-ticket/logout CSRF paths and the cookie Secure flag agree. Spoofing gains nothing: the host:port half of the origin tuple is untouched, browsers cannot attach the header cross-site without a preflight this API never grants, and forging it on plain http only adds Secure (the browser then drops the cookie — self-harm only). Regression tests: proxied https origin accepted (origin check, Secure flag, logout), comma-separated chains, scope-fallback path, spoofed header still rejects cross-origin, cannot downgrade real https, junk values ignored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): consume the stored admin key only after a successful exchange A remote-backend user upgrading with their backend unreachable lost the only stored copy of OMNIVOICE_API_KEY: every migration path deleted the durable ov_api_key BEFORE the session exchange settled, stranding them until they recovered the key from the server box. Close the whole class: - client.ts bootstrap: read the legacy key, exchange first, and remove the durable copy only after the exchange succeeds; on failure the key stays so the next launch retries the migration (auth gate still rises). - authSession.ts exchangeApiKey: move removeLegacyMaster from before the fetch to the cookie/bearer success paths — the key never coexists with a live session, but a rejected or hung exchange no longer consumes it. - remoteBackendProbe.ts configuredRemoteBackend: stop wiping the key on every app mount. - RemoteBackendPanel: a connection test or an aborted save no longer wipes the pending key; only disabling the remote backend discards it. - prefKeys.js: ov_api_key moves from PREF_KEYS to PRESERVED_KEYS — factory reset preserves the pending connection credential exactly like ov_backend_url; the successful migration is what deletes it. Tighten the credential-hygiene static guard to match: it accepted sessionStorage.setItem('ov_api_key', …) — the exact class it exists to close. The guard now flags .setItem(<master key>) on any storage receiver, quote style, or injected-store alias, with a self-test pinning what it catches and what stays legal. Fail-before/pass-after regression tests: backend unreachable retains the key and the next bootstrap retries it; a successful exchange removes it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(auth): make session validation occupancy-independent * test(auth): catch optional master-key storage calls * feat(docs): add PR control document for bultodepapas in VoiceStudio * docs: keep the PR tracking board in the fork; credit the changelog line The pr-control document is excellent process discipline, but it is the contributor's own operational board (their inventory, their update commands) — it lives naturally in their fork, and docs/agents/ here is context every repo agent loads. Removed with appreciation; the changelog line gains its contributor credit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: debpalash <4178343+debpalash@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
141 lines
5.6 KiB
Python
141 lines
5.6 KiB
Python
"""Exact-origin CSRF checks for ambient browser authentication."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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from urllib.parse import SplitResult, urlsplit
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CSRF_HEADER = "x-voicestudio-csrf"
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CSRF_VALUE = "1"
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SAFE_HTTP_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
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_FORWARDED_PROTO_HEADER = "x-forwarded-proto"
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def effective_scheme(connection) -> str:
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"""Scheme of the client-facing hop: the resolved scope, TLS-upgraded by proxy evidence.
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Behind a TLS-terminating proxy (Tailscale Serve — the flagship remote-GPU
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deployment in docs/remote-gpu.md — nginx, Caddy, ...) the browser talks
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``https`` while the backend hop is plain ``http``. uvicorn's
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ProxyHeadersMiddleware (on by default in both launch paths: ``uvicorn.run``
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in backend/main.py and the Docker ``python -m uvicorn`` entrypoint) already
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rewrites the ASGI scope from ``X-Forwarded-Proto``, but only when the peer
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is in ``--forwarded-allow-ips`` (default: loopback). That covers Serve on
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bare metal, and we prefer that signal — the scope is consulted first — but
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it misses Docker (the proxy connects from the bridge gateway) and any other
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non-loopback proxy topology, so the header is honored here as well.
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Spoofing analysis — why honoring it never weakens a check: the upgrade is
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one-way. ``https``/``wss`` as the first forwarded value promotes ``http``
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to ``https``; every other value is ignored, so a forged header can never
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downgrade a genuine TLS hop. For the exact-origin comparison the host:port
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half of the tuple is untouched, a browser cannot attach X-Forwarded-Proto
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cross-site without a CORS preflight this API never grants, and a
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non-browser client able to forge the header can already forge Origin
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itself — it gains nothing. For cookies the upgrade can only ADD the Secure
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flag (a Secure cookie set over plain http is simply dropped by the
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browser — the spoofer only breaks their own session), never strip it.
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"""
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url = getattr(connection, "url", None)
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scheme = getattr(url, "scheme", None)
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if not scheme:
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scope = getattr(connection, "scope", None)
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scheme = scope.get("scheme", "http") if isinstance(scope, dict) else "http"
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scheme = {"ws": "http", "wss": "https"}.get(scheme, scheme)
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if scheme != "https":
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headers = getattr(connection, "headers", None) or {}
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forwarded = (
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headers.get(_FORWARDED_PROTO_HEADER, "") if hasattr(headers, "get") else ""
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)
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if forwarded.split(",")[0].strip().lower() in {"https", "wss"}:
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scheme = "https"
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return scheme
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def _origin_tuple(value: str | None) -> tuple[str, str, int | None] | None:
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if not value or value == "null":
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return None
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try:
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parsed: SplitResult = urlsplit(value)
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port = parsed.port
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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return None
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if (
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not parsed.scheme
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or not parsed.hostname
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or parsed.username is not None
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or parsed.password is not None
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or parsed.path not in ("", "/")
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or parsed.query
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or parsed.fragment
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):
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return None
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scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
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if scheme not in {"http", "https", "tauri"}:
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return None
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if port is None:
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if scheme == "http":
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port = 80
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elif scheme == "https":
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port = 443
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return scheme, parsed.hostname.lower(), port
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def configured_allowed_origins() -> frozenset[tuple[str, str, int | None]]:
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raw_port = os.environ.get("OMNIVOICE_UI_PORT", "3901")
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try:
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ui_port = int(raw_port)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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ui_port = 3901
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values = os.environ.get(
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"OMNIVOICE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
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f"http://localhost:{ui_port},http://127.0.0.1:{ui_port},"
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"tauri://localhost,http://tauri.localhost",
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).split(",")
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return frozenset(
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origin
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for value in values
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if (origin := _origin_tuple(value.strip())) is not None
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)
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def _destination_origin(connection) -> tuple[str, str, int | None] | None:
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scheme = effective_scheme(connection)
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url = getattr(connection, "url", None)
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netloc = getattr(url, "netloc", None)
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if netloc:
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return _origin_tuple(f"{scheme}://{netloc}")
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scope = getattr(connection, "scope", None)
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headers = getattr(connection, "headers", None) or {}
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if not isinstance(scope, dict):
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return None
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host = headers.get("host", "") if hasattr(headers, "get") else ""
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return _origin_tuple(f"{scheme}://{host}")
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def origin_allowed(connection) -> bool:
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headers = getattr(connection, "headers", None) or {}
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origin_value = headers.get("origin", "") if hasattr(headers, "get") else ""
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presented = _origin_tuple(origin_value)
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if presented is None:
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return False
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return presented == _destination_origin(connection) or presented in configured_allowed_origins()
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def cookie_csrf_allowed(connection, *, side_effectful_get: bool = False) -> bool:
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headers = getattr(connection, "headers", None) or {}
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marker = headers.get(CSRF_HEADER, "") if hasattr(headers, "get") else ""
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if marker != CSRF_VALUE or not origin_allowed(connection):
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return False
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method = getattr(connection, "method", None)
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if method is None:
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scope = getattr(connection, "scope", None)
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method = scope.get("method", "GET") if isinstance(scope, dict) else "GET"
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method = str(method).upper()
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if side_effectful_get or method in SAFE_HTTP_METHODS:
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fetch_site = headers.get("sec-fetch-site", "") if hasattr(headers, "get") else ""
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return fetch_site == "same-origin"
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return True
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