Palash Debnath
4a6b978df9
* feat(01-01): encrypted settings store + alembic migration (AUTH-02, T-01-01) Adds the SQLite-backed encrypted settings store that Phase 1 token resolver will read from. Closes the at-rest plaintext risk for HF tokens (T-01-01). - backend/services/settings_store.py: get_hf_token / set_hf_token / clear_hf_token using Fernet symmetric AEAD. Stored value column never contains the literal "hf_" substring. - backend/services/_secret_key.py: per-install Fernet key derived via scrypt(machine-id + 16-byte random salt). machine-id resolution covers macOS (ioreg IOPlatformUUID), Linux (/etc/machine-id and dbus fallback), Windows (HKLM Cryptography MachineGuid via winreg). Final fallback to hostname+user with a warn log. - backend/migrations/versions/0001_phase1_settings_table.py: alembic migration adding `settings(key, value, updated_at)`. Idempotent — checks for an existing table so fresh installs (where _BASE_SCHEMA already created it) and v0.2.7 upgrades both succeed. - backend/core/db.py: _BASE_SCHEMA grows the settings table for fresh installs; init_db() now runs `alembic upgrade head` after the CREATE. - backend/migrations/env.py: honours an externally-set sqlalchemy.url so tests can point alembic at a fixture DB; falls back to core.config DB_PATH for production. - pyproject.toml: cryptography>=41 added explicitly (RESEARCH.md Assumption A1 was checked at execute-time and proved false; the dep was not present transitively, so the install would fail without this). Tests (10 cases, all green): - Round-trip encryption + plaintext-leakage check (T-01-01 invariant) - Salt persistence across clear/set cycles - InvalidToken decrypt path returns None (Open Question #5 resolution) - Concurrent reads consistent under sqlite WAL - Alembic upgrade on a hand-built v0.2.7 fixture DB preserves all existing tables + seeded rows (CLAUDE.md backward-compat constraint) - Alembic downgrade -1 drops only the settings table Refs #35. * feat(01-01): 3-source HF token resolver + log redactor + 5 read sites patched Closes the #35 bug class (bare os.environ.get('HF_TOKEN') reads) by routing every backend HF-token consumer through one resolver, and mitigates T-01-02 (info disclosure via logs) by stripping `hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}` substrings from every log record at the root logger. backend/services/token_resolver.py: - resolve(skip) — 3-source cascade (App → Env → HF-CLI), each source validated via huggingface_hub.whoami(); first valid wins. - on_401(active) — invalidate cache and re-resolve skipping the source that just 401'd (AUTH-06). - state() — three SourceState rows for the Settings UI: set, masked preview (hf_…<last 3>), whoami_user, whoami_ok. - save_app_token / clear_app_token — wraps settings_store + calls huggingface_hub.login(add_to_git_credential=False) per Pitfall #2. - 300-second whoami cache so repeated Settings-page renders don't hit the HF API. backend/core/logging_filter.py: - HFTokenRedactor(logging.Filter) — regex `hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}` so real tokens are masked but `hf_hub` / `hf_token` literals survive. - install_redaction_filter() — idempotent attach to root + every handler. backend/main.py: install the redactor at startup, BEFORE the file handler is added. Re-installed after the file handler attaches so the handler-attached filter list includes it too. Read-side call sites patched (per Pitfall #1 — every HF token read must flow through token_resolver.resolve()): - backend/api/routers/dub_core.py:540 (the original #35 site) - backend/api/routers/system.py:38 (_has_hf_token notification) - backend/services/model_manager.py:480 (diarization pipeline auth) - backend/services/sonitranslate.py:143 (Popen env for SoniTranslate child) - backend/services/sonitranslate.py:217 (gradio_client predict call) New endpoint: - GET /system/hf-token/state — returns the 3-source cascade state with masked tokens for the Wave 2 Settings UI panel. Grep gate confirmed clean: zero `os.environ.get("HF_TOKEN")` reads remain outside token_resolver.py. Tests (17 new cases, all green): - tests/backend/services/test_token_resolver.py: priority cascade, 401 skip mid-resolve, on_401 fallback, state() shape, save+login invariant (add_to_git_credential=False), HUGGING_FACE_HUB_TOKEN alias acceptance. - tests/backend/core/test_logging_filter.py: msg + args redaction, multi-token redaction, non-string args pass-through, short-token literals preserved, install_redaction_filter idempotence. Refs #35. * feat(01-01): Settings hf-token API endpoints + subprocess env injection (AUTH-03/04) Backend half of the Wave 2 Settings → API Keys UI plus the AUTH-04 subprocess env-injection invariant. backend/api/routers/settings.py: - POST /api/settings/hf-token — body {token: str} → save_app_token - DELETE /api/settings/hf-token — also_clear_hf_cli query → clear_app_token - GET /api/settings/hf-token/state — same shape as token_resolver.state() All three are gated by `Depends(require_loopback)` at the router level (threat T-01-03 mitigation; non-loopback Host → 403). backend/main.py: router mounted alongside existing API routers. Subprocess env injection (AUTH-04, threat T-01-04 disposition=accept): - backend/services/sonitranslate.py already updated in Task 2 to read via token_resolver.resolve() and inject HF_TOKEN + YOUR_HF_TOKEN into the SoniTranslate child env block. - backend/services/gpu_sandbox.py: NOT patched — the GPU sandbox runs in-process TTS generation that uses the parent's already-loaded HF state. Adding env injection there is a no-op (parent and child share state via multiprocessing.Pipe before any HF API call). - backend/services/model_manager.py:480 (Task 2): resolves in-process, no subprocess crosses here. - backend/api/routers/exports.py: subprocess.Popen calls only spawn `open` / `explorer` / `xdg-open` — file-manager launchers with no HF needs. Skipped per Task 3 conservative-patching rule. So the canonical AUTH-04 site for this milestone is sonitranslate.py. Future SubprocessBackend work in Phase 2 will inherit the same pattern. Tests (8 new cases, all green): - tests/backend/test_engine_spawn_token.py * POST /hf-token loopback → 200 + state.active == "app" * POST /hf-token non-loopback → 403 ("loopback origin required") * DELETE /hf-token clears settings_store + state.active == None * GET /hf-token/state returns 3 source rows in priority order * GET /hf-token/state non-loopback → 403 * env block contains HF_TOKEN + YOUR_HF_TOKEN when resolver returns one * env block does NOT contain an injected empty HF_TOKEN when resolver returns None * source-level check that backend/services/sonitranslate.py still reads via token_resolver.resolve() (regression guard against silent reverts of the AUTH-04 wiring) Full Wave 1 test suite: 35/35 green. Phase 0 smoke tests still green. Refs #35. * docs(01-01): SUMMARY + STATE update for Phase 1 Wave 1 completion Records execution outcome of the 3-task plan: 10 files created, 9 modified, 35 new test cases, 5 read sites patched, grep gate clean. Documents the two Rule-3/Rule-2 deviations applied (cryptography dep, env.py URL override), the subprocess-launcher inventory for Phase 2, and the known stray edit to the main repo's pyproject.toml that needs a one- line user action to revert. Updates STATE.md current-position table, progress bar, and open TODOs to point at Wave 2 (Plan 01-02) and Wave 3 (Plan 01-03) as the next steps.
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