On PostgreSQL with ENABLE_ORJSON off (the default), searching automations by a word from their prompt, or filtering models by a tag, found nothing when the word was non-ASCII, for example Chinese. SQLite, and PostgreSQL with ENABLE_ORJSON on, were fine. With the default setting non-ASCII text is saved as \uXXXX codes, and PostgreSQL reads the backslash in a search pattern as a special character, so the search never matched. Special characters in the search text are now taken literally, so these searches work on both databases, and a % or _ typed into them now matches only itself.
Fixes#31422
On the default SQLite setup (session sharing off), a POST to /api/v1/models/sync containing any model that already exists answered 200 with an empty list and stored nothing. After a 5 second stall, the only trace was "database is locked" in the server log.
The sync wrote each model's access grants while the model update was still uncommitted. Without session sharing the grant writes run on a second database session, and SQLite allows one writer at a time, so that write waited on the same request's uncommitted update until the busy timeout expired and the whole sync was dropped.
Grants are now written after the model changes are committed, the same order model create and update already use. A failed model commit now also leaves every grant untouched. PostgreSQL and setups with session sharing on behave as before.
Fixes#31346
Long conversations get progressively more expensive to stream into. Every message-level write reloads the entire chat JSON, walks every string in it for a null-byte sanitisation pass and rewrites the whole column, and reading a single message loads and validates the whole chat too. The websocket event emitter reads and then writes, so one message event round-trips the full conversation twice to change a few hundred bytes.
Reading one message now selects only history.messages out of the JSON column and indexes it in Python, so the rest of the chat is neither loaded nor model-validated. Writing one message now sanitises only what is actually entering the chat, plus the title column that is mirrored off the blob, instead of re-walking a conversation that was already sanitised when it was written. Legacy rows are still healed on read by get_chat_by_id, which is unchanged.
One behaviour change: chats written before the null-byte sanitisation existed can still hold null bytes in the stored JSON. Those rows used to be rewritten clean as a side effect of any message write, and are now cleaned when the chat is read instead. The visible consequence is that the message write and delete endpoints echo back the updated chat, and for such a legacy row that echo now carries the raw null bytes rather than stripped ones, until the next read of that chat heals it. A GET of the chat is unaffected, and title, the one text column that PostgreSQL cannot store a null byte in, is still sanitised on every write.
Measured on SQLite with a 10.8 MB chat (3000 messages): a single-message upsert is 227 ms before the branch and 173 ms after, and the legacy single-message read is 135 ms before and 79 ms after. The whole-blob scan the delete path used to run costs 5.40 ms on a 1.8 MB chat and 38.79 ms on the 10.8 MB one, and is gone.
Ref https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/issues/28169
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Any signed-in user can grow Open WebUI's memory without bound by posting model entries with invalid profile image URLs. ModelMeta's validator keeps a set of every distinct rejected value so it warns about each one once, storing the full string with no size cap. FastAPI validates the request body before create_new_model reaches its workspace.models permission check, so the value is retained even when the caller is refused with a 401.
The set and the warning it served both go away; the validator clears the value exactly as before. The warning named no model and truncated the value at 80 characters, so it identified nothing. models/users.py swallows the identical ValueError and substitutes a fallback with no logging, so silence matches the neighbouring code.
Measured over the real create route with distinct 4KB invalid values: 8.9 MB retained at 2,000 values and 33.7 MB at 8,000 before, flat at 1.1 MB after.
Any authenticated user could fetch the profile image of a model they have no access to, and could tell an existing model id from an unknown one by whether the response carried the image or the default logo.
The endpoint now serves an image only to callers who can see the model itself: the owner, an admin under the admin bypass, or the holder of a read grant, with the same rule applied to arena models defined in config. Everyone else gets the default logo, byte for byte the response an unknown id already returned, so ids can no longer be probed. BYPASS_MODEL_ACCESS_CONTROL is honoured here because it is what decides which models reach a user's model list to begin with.
Avatars now fall back to the default logo wherever a viewer meets a model id without holding a grant on it: a model reply in a channel shown to the other members, and the admin analytics and evaluation pages when the admin bypass is switched off.
Moving a folder under one of its own subfolders was accepted. A folder in a parent loop is never a root, so it and everything under it silently disappeared from the sidebar, and there was no way to get it back from the UI.
The move is now rejected with a 400, folders whose parent chain loops are put back at the root on the next folder list, and the folder tree traversals skip ids they have already visited so existing data in that state stays workable.
The timer scheduler polls once a second and cancels on every message send and chat open, the sidebar lists chats ordered by `updated_at`, and the folder badges count unread chats per folder. None of those could be served by an index, so each call read most of the `chat` table, and because `meta` sits after the chat payload column SQLite had to walk every row's overflow pages to get there. On a large history that stalls the sidebar, every chat switch and every send, and the idle poll alone burns about a quarter of a CPU core.
Timers now keep their due time in a dedicated `chat.timer_at` column behind a partial index, and the chat list, unread and unfinished-reply queries each get an index matching their filter and ordering. Existing pending timers are backfilled from their meta by the migration. Dropping the `internal` and `type` checks also makes a forked timer chat inert, where a fork used to copy `meta` verbatim and become a second claim target that could fire a duplicate timer.
Measured on SQLite, same rows returned:
| query | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| idle timer poll (2000 chats, 0.43 GB) | 170 ms | 0.04 ms |
| cancel on send and chat open (4000 chats, 377 MB) | 200 ms | 0.04 ms |
| sidebar chat list (15000 chats, 1.26 GB) | 157 ms | 1.8 ms |
| folder unread badges (15000 chats, 1.4 GB) | 54 ms | 0.2 ms |
PostgreSQL 17 serves all of them as index-only scans with no sort node. Exercised through fresh install, upgrade with seeded data, downgrade and re-upgrade on SQLite and PostgreSQL 17.
Fixes#27622
Exporting workspace models loaded every model row, built a full response object with its owner for each, and only then dropped the ones the caller may not see. On a large model table that made the export endpoint slow in proportion to models the user cannot even access.
The owner-or-grant check now happens in the query itself, reusing the permission filter this file already applies to the paginated list endpoint, so only visible rows are ever hydrated. The by-user wrapper had one caller left and is gone with it.
Measured with 500 workspace models of which 3 are visible to the caller: 5 queries and ~12.7 ms before, 4 queries and ~2.8 ms after. The resulting set is unchanged for owner, public, direct-user, group and multi-grant entries, and base model entries stay excluded as before.
Every streamed event that persists to a chat (status updates, citations,
file attachments, message content) serialized the entire conversation JSON
three times: a null-byte check of the stored row, a second sanitize of the
whole blob after merging in the event payload and the flush of the UPDATE
itself. The middle pass rescans megabytes of already-clean history for null
bytes that can only come from the small incoming payload, so long chats pay
for their full history on every single event.
The write paths now sanitize just the incoming message, message id and
status dict and keep the row-level sanitize, so legacy rows with null bytes
still self-heal as before. Median per-event write time (sqlite, orjson):
1 MB chat 15.0 ms to 11.1 ms, 4 MB 65.2 ms to 52.4 ms, 10 MB 159.9 ms to
124.5 ms, roughly 20 percent less per event. As a side effect the
chat_message dual write now receives the sanitized message; previously null
bytes in non-content fields were cleaned in the blob but written raw to
chat_message, which failed that insert on PostgreSQL. Verified byte-identical
rows against the previous implementation across nine scenarios covering null
bytes in every input, legacy dirty rows, a missing title and a NULL chat
column.
Listing a user's folders re-checks which entries they may still see, and it resolved their group membership again for every folder, then again inside the collection and note branches for every entry. A comment in that helper claims one membership fetch for the whole listing, but the caller invokes it once per folder, so the claim never held.
The listing now resolves membership once, and only when some folder actually carries entries, then threads it through the file, collection and note checks. Callers that do not supply it are unchanged and still resolve for themselves.
Measured with twenty folders holding six files, two knowledge bases and two notes each: 245 queries and ~145 ms before, 186 and ~117 ms after. The folders returned, and the entries the integrity pass writes back, are unchanged. That was checked against entries the caller owns, entries shared through a group, entries shared with nobody, another user's files, and an unrecognised entry type.
A calendar event's `meta` is a free-form dict, so `meta.alert_minutes` can hold any JSON type, while the upcoming-events lookup assumed it was a number and compared it directly. It now ignores a value that is not numeric and falls back to the default alert window for that event.
Handled on the read side rather than on the write path so events already stored with a non-numeric value are covered too. Numeric values are untouched, including the negative "no alert" sentinel.
Checking whether a user may reach a file loaded and validated every workspace model that user can access, then scanned each model's knowledge list in Python for one file id. Folder listings run that check once per file, so opening a folder of twenty files rebuilt the whole accessible-model set twenty times, and the same check sits on every retrieval and download path.
The lookup now runs the other way round: the database returns the models that attach the file, and only those are access-checked. The text match on the metadata column is a prefilter and the knowledge entries still decide, so a file id that merely appears in a description grants nothing; file ids are server-generated uuids, so the match can only be too wide, never too narrow.
Measured with 500 accessible workspace models: a single check drops from 9 queries and ~20 ms to 6 and ~2.6 ms, and a twenty-file folder listing from 180 queries and ~680 ms to 120 and ~56 ms. A 72-case matrix over owner, public, direct-user and group grants, for both read and write, returns exactly what it returned before, and write still requires the model owner to own the file. The check also no longer writes to the database while answering a read-only question.
Listing skills ran one database query per skill in the instance. A non-admin opening the list on a workspace with 500 skills issued over 500 queries, the paginated list re-resolved the caller's group membership once per row, and every chat message carrying a skill loaded every skill the user can read, full body and owner included, to use the two or three it actually referenced.
Skills now arrive already filtered: the owner-or-grant check runs in the query as an EXISTS subquery, the same way prompts and the search endpoints already do it, the per-item write flag uses the existing batch grant lookup, and the chat path asks only for the skill ids the request names.
Measured with 500 skills of which 3 are visible to the caller: 504 queries and ~300 ms before, 4 queries and ~2.6 ms after. The resulting set is unchanged for owner, public, direct-user, group and multi-grant entries, for both read and write.
Three methods on KnowledgeTable have no callers anywhere in the repository. get_knowledge_bases_by_user_id loaded every knowledge base and filtered them in Python, which search_knowledge_bases already does in SQL with pagination. get_knowledge_by_id_and_user_id duplicates check_access_by_user_id with the permission hardcoded to write. update_knowledge_data_by_id writes a data column that a migration dropped, so it could only ever raise and return None through its own except block.
What remains is one per-entry access helper and one SQL-filtered list path, so nobody reaches for the slower or the broken variant by accident.
No behaviour change.
Classic298